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1 Introduction 
This paper empirically investigates the role of aid in mitigating the adverse effects of 
commodity export price shocks on growth in commodity-dependent countries. Adverse 
price shocks can have negative effects, both ex ante and ex post. Ex ante, proneness to 
shocks increases uncertainty about future returns, which might reduce investment and 
hence growth, a problem sometimes referred to as vulnerability. Ex post, realized 
shocks can harm economic growth in the short run through their effect on aggregate 
demand or a government’s fiscal position.  
Aid might mitigate these effects through two distinct routes. Where aid can be made 
shock-continent, it acts like insurance. However, even if aid is not responsive to the 
realization of shocks, it might finance precautionary expenditures which make the 
economy more resilient to shocks, a proposition first seriously advanced by 
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001). Potentially, each form of aid might mitigate either 
effect. Aid as insurance directly compensates realized adverse shocks whereas aid for 
precautionary spending reduces their cost to the economy. Both thereby make the 
economy less vulnerable.   
Since insurance is the most appropriate solution to risk where it is feasible, shock-
contingent aid has some evident attractions. However, it faces three impediments. First, 
administratively it is generally only feasible to compensate the government of the 
country suffering the adverse shock. Where the shock affects the private sector such as 
export agriculture, compensation to government will cushion the macro economy but, 
through the exchange rate effect, it will compound the shock to its primary recipients. 
Second, aid disbursements are generally slow, so that entitlements triggered by a shock 
are only likely to reach the economy some years later. This was exemplified by the 
STABEX shock-contingent instrument of the European Commission, the disbursements 
from which were so heavily lagged that they were on average pro-cyclical. Third, 
shock-contingent aid would only reduce the costs of vulnerability if it was regarded as a 
credible long-term commitment, yet aid policies are widely perceived to be subject to 
fashion.  
If adverse shocks generate substantial economic costs, aid might more feasibly address 
them through precautionary effects which depend upon the level of aid rather than its 
responsiveness. One straightforward precautionary effect is that the higher is aid the less 
exposed is the economy to import compression resulting from a shock to commodity 
export earnings: a given absolute shock will require a smaller proportionate reduction in 
imports. Aid might also finance liquidity, both higher levels of foreign reserves and 
greater financial depth, which can then be used to cushion shocks to external income. 
Aid might also finance investments that enhance the flexibility of the economy. For 
example, by financing human capital it might make the workforce more adaptable, and 
by financing infrastructure it might make factors more mobile.  
In our analysis we first test to what extent shocks matter for growth, both through 
increased vulnerability (ex ante), and through the realization of shocks (ex post). We 
then investigate whether either the level of aid, or shock-contingent aid, mitigate the 
negative effects of shocks.    2
We allow for exchange rate flexibility as an alternative or additional instrument to 
mitigate shocks. Broda (2004) finds that the short-run output response to terms-of-trade 
changes is significantly smaller in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes than in 
those with fixed regimes. The underlying argument is that when economies are hit by 
real shocks and prices are sticky, the exchange rate can play a crucial role in 
smoothening quantity responses by allowing for a quicker adjustment of relative prices. 
We test the robustness of Broda’s results for commodity export price shocks. In 
addition, we investigate whether exchange rate flexibility and aid are potentially 
substitutes. In particular, we test whether the effect of aid is different in countries with 
fixed exchange rates, which do not have an automatic alternative line of defense, than in 
countries with flexible exchange rates.  
Using data for 100 countries from 1971 until 2003, we find that negative commodity 
export price shocks matter substantially for short-term growth, while the ex ante risk of 
shocks does not seem to matter for long-run GDP. We also find that both the level of aid 
and exchange rate flexibility substantially lower the adverse effect of shocks. 
Incremental, shock-contingent aid, does not seem to mitigate the effect of shocks. While 
the level of aid mitigates shocks, regardless of a country’s exchange rate regime, the 
mitigating effect seems to be somewhat smaller for countries with flexible exchange 
rates, suggesting that aid and exchange rate flexibility are partly substitutes. Having 
established that aid can be effective in shock-prone countries, we then investigate 
whether aid has historically been targeted at such countries, but find no evidence that 
this is the case. This suggests that donors could increase aid effectiveness by redirecting 
aid towards countries that suffer from a high incidence of commodity export price 
shocks.   
This paper is related to the literature on terms-of-trade shocks and aid effectiveness. It is 
most closely related to Collier and Dehn (2001), who show that the adverse effects of 
negative shocks can be mitigated by offsetting increases in aid. This paper improves 
upon their study by using instrumental variables for aid, applying several alternative 
dynamic panel estimation techniques, and allowing the effect of shocks to be 
proportional to commodity exports. We also test the importance of the ex ante risk of 
shocks as well as the realized shocks, and investigate the role of a country’s exchange 
rate regime. In addition, we look at whether aid and exchange rate flexibility are 
substitutes or complements and we use a much larger and richer dataset. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data, 
methodology, and the construction of variables, and deals with the endogeneity of   
aid. Section 3 presents the main findings. Section 4 provides sensitivity analysis. 
Section 5 investigates whether aid has historically been targeted at shock-prone 
countries. Section 6 concludes.  
2  Data and methodology 
Our estimation strategy involves two steps. We first test the importance of commodity 
export price shocks and commodity export price uncertainty as determinants of GDP. 
Having established which of these have negative effects on GDP, we then investigate 
the potential role of foreign aid in mitigating these negative effects. The effects of   3
shocks and uncertainty, as well as the mitigating effect of aid are analysed using the 
following error-correction model:1 
) 1 (                                 + ∑∑ ) )( ( ′ + ∑ ) )( ( ′ +             
∑ ′ + ∑ ′ + Δ ∑ ′ + Δ ∑ + ′ + + + = Δ
,
0 =1 =
, - , - , 7
1 =














r h t i h t i r
v
r












t i t i t i t i
u p s β p x β
p β s β x β y β x β y λ δ α y
where yi,t is log real GDP per capita in country i in year t and αi and δt are country-
specific and year-specific fixed effects, respectively. xi,t-1 is a z × 1 vector of z variables 
that are expected to affect GDP both in the short run and long run. This vector includes 
our indicator of commodity export price uncertainty to test its long-run effect on GDP. 
In addition, we include several controls. Four variables are taken from the empirical 
growth literature: (i) trade openness, measured as the ratio of trade to GDP, (ii) external 
debt to GNI, (iii) inflation, measured as the consumer price index (cpi), and   
(iv) financial development, measured as the ratio of M2 to GDP. Following Collier and 
Goderis (2007), we also include indices of commodity export prices and oil import 
prices to control for the long-run effect of commodity prices on GDP. Section 2.1 
explains how these variables were constructed. 
si,t-h is an l × 1 vector of l variables that are expected to have a short-run effect on 
growth. We first include our indicators of commodity export price shocks (see 
Section 2.1) to estimate the effects of large changes in commodity export prices. In 
addition, we include measures of geological, climatic, and human disasters (Raddatz 
2007), and dummy variables for civil wars and coup d’états as controls.  
pi,t-j is a vector of v × 1 vector of v variables that could mitigate the adverse effects of 
commodity export price shocks and uncertainty. First, we include a dummy variable 
which takes a value of 1 for a de facto flexible exchange rate, and 0 for a de facto fixed 
exchange rate. Second, we include both the level and the first difference of the log of  
(1 + foreign aid), where foreign aid is measured as a percentage of GNI.2 We refer to 
the variable ‘log (1 + foreign aid)’ as ‘aid’. In Section 2.2 we discuss the endogeneity of 
aid. The interactions of xi,t-1 and si,t-h with pi,t-j are used to test the central hypotheses: if 
commodity export price shocks and commodity export price uncertainty harm economic 
performance, the losses will be smaller for countries that receive more aid.  
Our dataset consists of all countries and years for which data are available, and covers 
100 countries between 1971 and 2003. Table 1 reports summary statistics. Table 2a lists 
the countries and their share of commodity exports in GDP. The data appendix 
describes data and sources. 
 
 
                                                 
1   This model is based on the model in Collier and Goderis (2007). For sensitivity, we also run the model 
without the long-run cointegrating vector of level variables (see Section 4). Results are robust. 
2   In order to use the log linear form, we use 1 + foreign aid.    4
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 Obs  Mean  Std  dev  Min  Max 
GDP per capita (log)  2319  6.80  1.12  4.31  9.17 
Trade to GDP (log)  2306  4.05  0.57  1.84  5.43 
External debt to GNI (log)  2317  3.90  0.84  -0.11  7.10 
CPI (log)  2312  2.52  4.27  -26.98  7.00 
M2 to GDP (log)  2317  3.31  0.55  1.41  5.02 
Commodity export price index (log)  2319  43.19  39.36  0.04  205.39 
Commodity exports to GDP  2319  9.42  8.83  0.01  44.61 
Export price uncertainty (log)  2319 0.09 0.19 0.00 3.70 
Oil import price index (log)  2319  3.27  1.85  0  4.96 
Flexible exchange rate  1736  0.62  0.49  0  1 
Aid (log)  2311  1.57  1.05  -1.17  4.59 
Δ GDP per capita (log)  2319  0.01  0.05  -0.36  0.30 
Δ Trade to GDP (log)  2306  0.01  0.14  -1.20  1.40 
Δ CPI (log)  2312  0.17  0.37  -0.14  5.48 
Δ Aid (log)  2310  -0.01  0.27  -1.38  1.62 
Coup d’etat  2319  0.03  0.18  0  2 
Civil war  2319  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Geological shocks  2319  0.06  0.24  0  2 
Climatic shocks  2319  0.27  0.52  0  3 
Humanitarian shocks  2319  0.03  0.16  0  2 
Export price shocks 
 Number  Mean  Std  dev  Min  Max 
Positive  shocks  223  0.34 0.16 0.12 1.03 
Negative  shocks  231  0.31 0.13 0.15 0.81 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for all observations used in estimation. 
Table 2a: List of countries and their shares of commodity exports in GDP (%) 
Albania (3)  Congo, D.R. (9)  India (1)  Pakistan (2)  Tonga (0) 
Algeria (15)  Congo, Rep. (29)  Indonesia (15)  Panama (5)  Tr.& Tob. (19) 
Angola (35)  Costa Rica (11)  Iran (14)  P. N. Guin. (18)  Tunisia (6) 
Argentina (3)  Cote d'Ivoire (14)  Jamaica (18)  Paraguay (12)  Turkey (1) 
Bangladesh (1)  Dominica (19)  Kenya (6)  Peru (6)  Uganda (4) 
Barbados (2)  Dom. Rep. (7)  Laos (1)  Philippines (3)  Uruguay (4) 
Belize (13)  Ecuador (21)  Lesotho (0)  Poland (3)  Vanuatu (5) 
Benin (0)  Egypt (2)  Lithuania (0)  Romania (1)  Venezuela (32) 
Bolivia (12)  El Salvador (6)  Madagascar (2)  Rwanda (4)  Vietnam (18) 
Botswana (7)  Eq. Guinea (6)  Malawi (20)  Samoa (1)  Yemen (1) 
Brazil (2)  Ethiopia (2)  Malaysia (21) Senegal  (6) Zambia  (35) 
Bulgaria (2)  Fiji (12)  Maldives (2)  Seychelles (0)  Zimbabwe (9) 
Burkina Faso (3)  Gabon (31)  Mali (7)  Sierra Leone (7)   
Burundi (6)  Gambia (4)  Mauritania (25)  Sol. Islands (8)     5
Cambodia (3)  Ghana (11)  Mauritius (15)  South Africa (3)   
Cameroon (15)  Grenada (4)  Mexico (4)  Sri Lanka (7)   
Cape Verde (1)  Guatemala (8)  Morocco (4)  Sudan (2)   
C. Afr. Rep. (2)  Guin.-Bissau (1)  Mozambique (1)  Swaziland (22)   
Chad (6)  Guyana (45)  Nepal (0)  Syria (15)   
Chile (16)  Haiti (1)  Nicaragua (17)  Tanzania (5)   
China (2)  Honduras (20)  Niger (0)  Thailand (4)   
Colombia (11)  Hungary (2)  Nigeria (35)  Togo (14)   
 
Table 2b: List of commodities 
Non-agricultural 
Aluminum Gasoline  Natural  gas  Phosphatrock  Uranium 
Coal Ironore  Nickel  Silver  Urea 
Copper Lead  Oil  Tin  Zinc 
Agricultural 
Bananas Cotton  Oliveoil  Pulp  Sugar 
Barley Fish  Oranges  Rice  Sunfloweroil 
Butter Groundnutoil  Palmkerneloil  Rubber  Swinemeat 
Cocoabeans Groundnuts  Palmoil  Sisal  Tea 
Coconutoil Hides  Pepper  Sorghum  Tobacco 
Coffee Jute  Plywood  Soybeanoil  Wheat 
Copra Maize  Poultry Soybeans  Wool 
2.1 Constructing indicators of commodity export prices, shocks, and uncertainty 
The commodity export price index was constructed using the methodology of Deaton 
and Miller (1996), Dehn (2000), and Collier and Goderis (2007). We collected data on 
world commodity prices and commodity export values for as many commodities as data 
availability allowed. Table 2b lists the 58 commodities in our sample. For each of the 
countries, we calculate the total value of 1990 commodity exports and construct weights 
by dividing the 1990 export values for each commodity by this total. These weights are 
held fixed over time and applied to the world price indices of the same commodities to 
form a country-specific geometrically weighted index. 
It is important that the commodity export price index is exogenous, i.e. not correlated 
with the error term in equation (1). As argued by Deaton and Miller (1996), one of the 
advantages of using international commodity prices is that they are typically not 
affected by the actions of individual countries. Also, by keeping the weights constant 
over time, supply responses to price changes are not included. As a result, we believe 
the index to be exogenous with respect to GDP or the determinants of GDP. In our 
estimation, we use the log of the commodity export price index, weighted by the level 
of commodity exports over GDP as of 1990 (%), which allows the impact of commodity 
prices to be proportional to a country’s commodity exports.   6
We next use the unweighted logged index to construct indicators of commodity export 
price shocks and uncertainty. Following Collier and Dehn (2001), we identify shocks by 
differencing the commodity export price index to make it stationary, and then removing 
predictable elements from the stationary process by running the following basic annual 
forecasting model:  
) 2 (                                                                        + + Δ + + = Δ , 2 - , 2 1 - , 1 1 0 , t i t i t i t i ε I β I β t α α I  
where Ii,t is the log commodity export price index and t is a linear time trend. We collect 
the residuals εi,t from (2) and derive the 10th and 90th percentile of their distribution. 
We next define positive and negative commodity export price shock episodes as the 
observations with residuals above the 90th percentile or below the 10th percentile, 
respectively.3 Having identified the shock episodes, we construct 2 variables. The first 
captures positive commodity export price shocks and equals the first log difference of 
the commodity export price index for the positive shock episodes, and 0 otherwise. The 
second captures negative commodity export price shocks and equals minus the first log 
difference of the commodity export price index for the negative shock episodes, and 0 
otherwise. Table 1 provides summary statistics. The sample contains 223 positive and 
231 negative shocks. We perform one further procedure. Any impact of commodity 
price shocks is likely to be bigger for more commodity-dependent countries. We 
therefore use the log difference of the index, weighted by the (log of the) share of 
commodity exports in GDP as of 1990. This allows the effect of export price shocks to 
be log linearly proportional to a country’s exposure. 
In addition to actual shocks, we also include a measure of export price uncertainty. 
Following Dehn (2000), we use a GARCH (1,1) model in which the actual volatility in 
a country’s commodity export prices is explained by past volatility and past expected 
volatility: 
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where It is the log commodity export price index in quarter t, t is a linear time trend, Dt 
is a vector of quarterly dummies to remove seasonal effects, and σ
2
t denotes the 
variance of εt, conditional upon information up to period t. We use the fitted values of 
the second equation in (3) as a measure of commodity export price uncertainty, since it 
captures the ‘predicted’ variance of the innovations in commodity export prices from 
past actual and expected volatility. Intuitively, this makes use of the concept of 
volatility clustering: big shocks tend to be followed by big shocks in either direction. 
This implies that historical information about the volatility in commodity prices can be 
used to predict future volatility. It is the (log) of the predicted future volatility that we 
use as a measure of uncertainty. Again, to allow the effect of commodity price 
uncertainty to be (log linearly) proportional to the importance of commodity exports, we 
weigh the indicator of uncertainty by the (log of the) share of commodity exports to 
GDP as of 1990. 
                                                 
3   These cut-off points are admittedly arbitrary. For sensitivity, we also run our specifications when 
using the 5th and 95th percentile as cut-off points. The results are robust to this alternative definition 
of shocks.   7
The oil import price index was constructed by taking a logged index of world oil prices 
and interacting it with a dummy for net oil importers. This variable is important as oil 
enters the commodity export price index but is at the same time likely to affect oil 
importers as well. Failing to control for this effect would therefore have the 
consequence that the coefficient on the commodity export price index, instead of 
capturing the effect of higher oil prices for oil exporters, would capture the difference 
between the effects on oil exporters and importers. 
2.2 The endogeneity of aid: using instrumental variables 
Aid is likely to be endogenous with respect to growth. Past growth or even expected 
future growth of recipient countries may affect the aid allocation decisions of donors. 
These decisions may also be correlated with omitted variables that affect growth. In 
both cases the OLS estimator is biased. To address this problem, we use instruments for 
aid in all our specifications. Tavares (2003) argues that, ‘when an OECD country 
increases its total aid outflows, developing countries that are culturally and 
geographically closer to that donor country experience an exogenous increase in aid 
inflows as a share of their GDP’. We follow Tavares by constructing aid instruments as 
follows. We collect total bilateral aid outflows from the five largest OECD donors: 
France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US, and express them as a proportion of GNI. 
In 2003 about half of total global aid was provided by these five donors. We then 
generate four variables that capture the political, geographical, and cultural distance for 
each donor/recipient combination. For political distance we use an index of UN voting 
affinity (Gartzke and Jo 2002). For each donor/recipient combination we calculate the 
average value of the index over the available years and use this average for every year.4 
For geographical distance, we use the inverse of the distance in kilometers between the 
recipient countries’ capitals and the donor countries’ capitals.5 Cultural distance is 
measured by 2 dummies. The first dummy takes a value of unity if the donor and 
recipient share a common language (CIA 2003). The other dummy takes a value of 
unity if the same religious group dominates in both the donor and the recipient country.6 
All distance indicators are invariant over time but vary across recipient countries while 
the aid outflows vary over time but not across recipient countries. We construct 20 
instruments by interacting each of the indicators with each of the aid outflows. These 
variables will be used as instruments for the level of aid. We first-difference the 20 
instruments to create an additional 20 instruments for differenced aid. Next to the level 
and difference of aid we include several interactions of the aid variables with the shock 
variables. We create instruments for these interactions by regressing the aid variables on 
all aid instruments and other regressors and interacting the predicted values with the 
shock variables to construct additional instruments (following Goderis and Ioannidou 
2008). We use all instruments and perform two-stage least-squares estimation.  
                                                 
4   Due to the fact that data are only available until 1996 and for Germany only start in 1974 (UN 
admittance).  
5   For the three European donor countries we use the distance to Brussels. Data are from the World 
Bank.  
6   Source: Barrett (1982). The dummy takes a value of 1 if 30 per cent or more of the population belongs 
to one religious group in both the donor and recipient country.   8
3 Estimation  results 
Table 3 reports estimation results for the model in equation (1) but without the vector of 
variables that potentially mitigate the effect of adverse shocks and its interactions with 
shocks and uncertainty. This allows us to test the effects of negative commodity export 
price shocks and commodity price uncertainty on GDP.  
The contemporaneous and lagged negative export price shocks enter negative but only 
the lagged shock is significant (at 5 per cent). The coefficient is also much larger for the 
lagged shock, suggesting that, if there is an effect of negative export price shocks on 
growth, it occurs in the year after the shock.7 The coefficient is -0.017 which suggests 
that for a country with sample average commodity exports to GDP (9.42 per cent), a 
sample average negative export price shock (30 per cent) lowers next year’s growth by 
0.017*log(9.42)*0.30 = 1.14% points.  
While negative commodity export price shocks significantly lower growth, we do not 
find evidence of a long-run negative effect of commodity export price uncertainty on 
GDP. Although the indicator of uncertainty enters with the expected negative sign, it is 
far from significant. 
The other long-run coefficients all have the expected signs. Trade to GDP enters 
positive and is significant at 1 per cent, indicating that more open countries tend to have 
higher long-run GDP levels. External debt and the consumer price index enter negative, 
suggesting that countries with fiscal imprudence or historically high inflation rates have 
lower long-run GDP. However, the coefficients are insignificant, so should be viewed 
with caution. The same goes for M2 to GDP, which enters with a positive sign, 
indicating that financial development boosts long-run GDP. The commodity export 
price index enters negative and is significant at 5 per cent, consistent with Collier and 
Goderis (2007), who find that, while higher commodity prices boost growth in the short 
run, their long-run effect on GDP is negative. Higher oil import prices also negatively 
affect GDP, although this effect is insignificant. The coefficient of the lagged level of 
GDP per capita is negative and significant at 1 per cent. The size suggests a speed of 
adjustment of 6 per cent per year.  
Most of the short-run coefficients also have the expected signs. The first lag of the 
dependent variable enters positive and is highly significant, while the fourth lag has a 
significant negative effect, suggesting some mean reversion. Contemporaneous and 
lagged increases in trade openness and inflation are also important for growth. As 
expected, positive export price shocks have a positive effect on growth, both in the same 
year as in the next, while coups and wars have large adverse effects. A coup appears to 
cut growth by around 2.7 per cent points in the same year, while for wars this effect is 
1.9 per cent, roughly consistent with Collier (1999) who documents a growth loss 
during war of 2.2 per cent points. Geological shocks significantly reduce growth by 1.1 
per cent in the same year and by another 0.8 per cent in year t+2. Climatic shocks have 
no significant effect in the same year but actually augment growth in the next three 
years by around 0.5 per cent, which may be due to external assistance. Humanitarian 
shocks do not appear to have significant growth effects. 
                                                 
7   We tried adding further lags but they proved unimportant.   9
Table 3: Estimation results cointegration model 
Long-run coefficients    Short-run coefficients (cont’d) 
Trade to GDP (log)  0.456***    Δ CPI (log)t-1  -0.009*** 
 (0.122)      (0.003) 
External debt to GNI (log)  -0.071    Positive price shockt  0.010** 
 (0.048)      (0.005) 
CPI (log)  -0.004    Positive price shockt-1  0.011** 
 (0.007)      (0.005) 
M2 to GDP (log)  0.056    Negative price shockt  -0.001 
 (0.095)      (0.006) 
Commodity export price index   -0.014**    Negative price shockt-1  -0.017** 
(log) (0.006)      (0.008) 
Export price uncertainty (log)  -0.076    Coupt -0.027*** 
 (0.154)      (0.009) 
Oil import price index (log)  -0.106    Wart -0.019*** 
 (0.118)      (0.006) 
Short-run adjustment coefficient   Geological  shockt -0.011** 
GDP per capita (log)t-1 -0.058***      (0.005) 
 (0.009)    Geological  shockt-1 -0.001 
Short-run coefficients     (0.004) 
Δ (GDP per capita (log))t-1  0.138***   Geological  shockt-2 -0.008** 
 (0.034)      (0.003) 
Δ (GDP per capita (log))t-2 -0.039    Climatic  shockt -0.001 
 (0.027)      (0.002) 
Δ (GDP per capita (log))t-3 0.043    Climatic  shockt-1 0.005** 
 (0.033)      (0.002) 
Δ (GDP per capita (log))t-4 -0.072***    Climatic  shockt-2 0.005** 
 (0.025)      (0.002) 
Δ (Trade to GDP (log))t-1 0.018*    Climatic  shockt-3 0.006*** 
 (0.010)      (0.002) 
Δ (Trade to GDP (log))t-2 0.019**    Humanitarian  shockt -0.004 
 (0.009)      (0.009) 
Number of observations  2319   R-squared  within  0.17 
Number of countries  100       
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3.1 The effect of negative commodity export price shocks 
Having established that commodity export price shocks significantly harm growth in the 
next year, we now investigate whether aid mitigates this effect.8 To save space, Table 4 
only reports results for the variables of interest. Column (1) shows the coefficient of the 
lagged negative export price shock variable. We choose the lag of the shock rather than 
its contemporaneous value as, according to our preferred specification in Table 3 (which 
excludes the insignificant export price uncertainty variable), this is the most important 
for contemporaneous growth. The coefficient on the lagged shock is -0.018, which is 
similar to its previous value, and is again significant at 5 per cent. It indicates that for 
the average commodity-dependent country the effect of a negative shock of 30 per cent 
on next year’s growth is a -1.21 per cent point reduction in the growth rate of GDP. But 
for a more commodity-dependent country like Cameroon, which has commodity exports 
of 15.2 per cent of GDP (around the 75th percentile of the distribution in our sample), 
this effect is higher: a -1.47 per cent point reduction. A highly commodity-dependent 
country like Zambia with commodity exports of 34.9 per cent of GDP, suffers even 
more severe: -1.92 per cent points.  
We next add instrumented aid to test whether the effect of adverse shocks is less severe 
in countries that receive more aid. Because in principle both the level of aid and the 
change in aid could be important, we add nine additional regressors to the specification 
in column (1): the lagged level of aid, the contemporaneous and lagged first difference 
of aid, and interactions of each of these three variables with both the lagged positive and 
the lagged negative export price shock variables. Table 4, column (2), reports the results 
for the lagged negative export price shock and its interactions with the three aid 
variables. The lagged shock again enters negative, has gained in size and is now 
significant at 1 per cent. The interaction of the shock with the lagged level of aid enters 
positive and is also significant at 1 per cent. This indicates that the growth loss from 
shocks is smaller for countries with higher levels of aid. In other words, aid mitigates 
shocks. The interactions of the lagged negative shock with both contemporaneous and 
lagged first differenced aid enter positive as well, but are not significant. Hence, aid is 
effective in mitigating shocks but only through the level of aid in the year of the shock 
and not by any increases in aid, either in the year of the shock or the next year. In 
Table 4, column (3), we drop lagged differenced aid and the interactions of differenced 
and lagged differenced aid. The interaction of the level of aid with the shock again 
enters positive and remains significant at 1 per cent, while the size of the coefficient is 
similar to its previous value. Recall that for the average commodity-dependent country, 
the effect of a negative export price shock of 30 per cent on next year’s growth is -1.21 
per cent points. Although the results in Table 4, column (3) are best interpreted as linear 
approximations that apply within the core range of the observed variables, taken 
literally they imply that a country that received no aid would lose 3.16 per cent points,9 
while the adverse growth effects would be fully offset for a country that received aid of 
6.72 per cent of GNI. 
 
                                                 
8   Since it is insignificant, we drop commodity export price uncertainty in all subsequent specifications. 
9   Hence the log of (1 + foreign aid) equals zero.   11
Table 4: The effect of negative commodity export price shocks – cointegration model with instrumented aid 
  full sample  full sample  full sample full  sample pegs  floats 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Negative export price shockt-1  -0.018**  -0.056*** -0.047*** -0.060*** -0.092*** -0.027** 
  (0.008)  (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.036) (0.011) 
Aidt-1 * Negative export price shockt-1    0.025*** 0.023*** 0.014**  0.045**  0.016** 
    (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.021) (0.007) 
ΔAidt-1 * Negative export price shockt-1    0.063      
    (0.056)      
ΔAidt * Negative export price shockt-1    0.017      
    (0.075)      
Flexible exchange ratet-1 * Negative export price shockt-1      0.038***    
      (0.011)    
Number  of  observations  2319  1513 1514 1170 405  765 
Number  of  countries  100  88 88 70 45 54 
R-squared within  0.17  0.13 0.17 0.23 0.29 0.26 
Notes: Table 4 only reports coefficients and standard errors of the variables of interest. The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita in year t. 
All regressions include country-specific and time-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The six columns correspond to the following specifications: Column (1) specification in Table 3 but without export price uncertainty; column (2) previous column with nine 
additional regressors: lagged level of aid, contemporaneous and lagged differenced aid, and interactions of each of these three variables with both lagged export price 
shock variables; column (3) specification in column (1) with four additional regressors: lagged level of aid, differenced aid, and the interaction of the lagged level of aid 
with both lagged export price shock variables; column (4) previous column with six additional regressors: contemporaneous and lagged floating exchange rate indicator 
and interactions of these indicators with the contemporaneous and lagged two export price shock variables, respectively; column (5) specification of column (3) but 
applied to subsample of countries and episodes with a pegged exchange rate; column (5) specification of column (3) but applied to subsample of countries and episodes 
with a flexible exchange rate.   12
We next investigate whether a country’s exchange rate regime also matters for shock 
mitigation. When an economy is hit by a real shock and prices are sticky, a flexible 
nominal exchange rate allows for a quicker adjustment of relative prices and limits the 
output loss. Broda (2004) has found that developing countries with more flexible 
exchange rates suffer lower growth losses from adverse terms-of-trade shocks. We test 
whether his finding is robust to adverse commodity export price shocks using the 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification of de facto exchange rate flexibility. Hence, 
we add six additional regressors to the specification in Table 4, column (3): a 
contemporaneous and a lagged indicator of exchange rate flexibility, and interactions of 
these two indicators with the contemporaneous and lagged export price shock variables, 
respectively. The results are reported in Table 4, column (4). The interaction of lagged 
exchange rate flexibility with the lagged export price shock enters positive and is 
significant at 1 per cent. This indicates that, consistent with Broda (2004), countries 
with flexible exchange rates suffer less from a negative shock. However, the mitigating 
effect of the level of aid is robust to adding exchange rate flexibility as an additional 
mitigation instrument. The interaction of aid with the shock again enters positive, 
although the coefficient is smaller, and is significant at 5 per cent. The shock itself again 
enters negative, is slightly bigger, and remains significant at 1 per cent. 
Having established that both aid and exchange rate flexibility are important for the 
mitigation of adverse shocks, we again consider the effect of a negative export price 
shock of 30 per cent. Figure 1 illustrates the mitigating roles of both instruments by 
showing next year’s growth loss for different levels of exports and different levels of aid 
and exchange rate flexibility. The ‘fixed and zero aid’ line corresponds to the growth 
effect of a negative shock in countries that run a fixed exchange rate and do not receive 
aid. The effect is (log linearly) proportional to a country’s exposure and for commodity 
exports to GDP ratios above 1 per cent, is always significant at 1 per cent. It is also 
economically relevant: a country with 20 per cent exports to GDP suffers a 5.5 per cent 
growth loss in the year after the shock. The ‘flexible and zero aid’ line shows the 
growth effect in countries that have a flexible exchange rate and do not receive aid. The 
location of the line above the ‘flexible and zero aid’ line indicates that a flexible 
exchange rate mitigates the effect of shocks, although not fully offsetting it. The country 
with 20 per cent exports to GDP that suffered a growth loss of 5.5 per cent points under 
a peg, suffers ‘only’ 2.1 per cent points of growth loss under a flexible exchange rate.  
The ‘fixed and average aid’ line illustrates the growth effect in countries with a peg that 
receive a sample average of aid of 3.8 per cent of GNI. Average aid also mitigates the 
negative effect of shocks, although to a smaller extent than exchange rate flexibility. 
The country with exports to GDP of 20 per cent that suffered a growth loss of 5.5 per 
cent points under a peg with no aid, suffers ‘only’ 3.5 per cent points of growth loss 
with average aid. Finally, the ‘flexible and average aid’ line shows the growth effect in 
countries that have a flexible exchange rate and receive average aid of 3.8 per cent of 
GNI. The line is almost horizontal and lies just below the horizontal axis. The very 
small negative effects are never significant. This suggests that the combination of 
exchange rate flexibility and average aid fully offsets the negative effect of commodity 
export price shocks. 
   13
Figure 1: The effect of a negative commodity export price shock of 30% (sample mean) for different levels of 
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Notes: Figure 1 is based on the estimation results in Table 4, column (4). A value of -2 on the vertical axis corresponds to a growth loss of 2 percentage points. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The results in Table 4, column (4), and Figure 1 assume that aid and exchange rate 
flexibility are complements. The mitigating effect of either one of them does not depend 
on whether the other instrument is also at work. We next investigate whether the two 
instruments are to some extent substitutes. It could be that there is less of a role to play 
for aid in countries that already have a mitigating instrument through their flexible 
exchange rate. Aid would then be most effective in countries with pegged exchange 
rates, as they are most in need of a shock cushioning instrument. However, if aid and 
exchange rate flexibility are complements, then aid can contribute to the mitigation of 
shocks in all countries, regardless of their exchange rate regime.  
To test the potentially different effects of aid in countries with fixed and flexible 
exchange rates, we re-estimate the specification in Table 4, column (3), for sub-samples 
of countries and years with a pegged exchange rate in the year of the shock, and 
countries and years with a flexible exchange rate in the year of the shock. The results 
are reported in Table 4, column (5) and (6). In both columns, the interaction of aid and 
the shock enters negative and is statistically significant at 5 per cent. This provides 
evidence that aid and exchange rate flexibility are not full substitutes. Even in countries 
with flexible exchange rates aid can be used to further mitigate the negative effects of 
shocks. The smaller coefficient of the shock itself in column (6) is consistent with the 
earlier finding that countries with flexible exchange rates suffer less from adverse 
export price shocks. However, although the interaction of aid with the export price 
shock is significant in both columns, the coefficient is much smaller in column (6). This 
points at the possibility that, although aid always cushions shocks, it does so more 
strongly in countries with fixed exchange rates.10 
This result is pertinent for the debate on whether aid is more effective in the context of 
good policies, a proposition initiated by Burnside and Dollar (2000). Our results imply 
that some ‘good’ policies, notably exchange rate flexibility, are substitutes for aid, 
suggesting that policies need to be decomposed before a clear relationship can be 
established. For example, aid effectiveness might plausibly be complemented by good 
processes for public spending. If aid and exchange rate flexibility are substitutes, what 
might this imply for aid allocation? Donors would presumably be reluctant to ‘reward’ 
poor choice of exchange rate policy with additional aid. However, there might be a case 
for reallocating aid within exchange rate regimes, so that among those countries with 
fixed exchange rates greater weight was given to the proneness of a country to shocks. 
This may be particularly pertinent to French aid to Franc Zone countries. Since the 
French government is committed to the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate regime 
for these countries, the issue of rewarding poor policy choices does not arise. But within 
the zone aid will be differentially effective in those countries most exposed to adverse 
shocks. 
 
                                                 
10   We tested this hypothesis by re-estimating the specification in Table 4, column (4), but adding an 
interaction between the exchange rate dummy and the aid-shock interaction. We also experimented 
with interactions between the exchange rate dummy and all other regressors. In both cases, the 
interaction between exchange rate flexibility and the aid-shock interaction entered with the expected 
negative sign but was insignificant.    15
4 Sensitivity  analysis 
The model in equation (1) assumes that the level variables are cointegrated. Collier and 
Goderis (2007) perform tests to establish whether this assumption is valid and find that 
this is the case. However, for sensitivity we also experiment with a model in which we 
strip the specification in (1) by removing the vector of long-run GDP determinants,  
xi,t-1, and the lagged level of GDP per capita, yi,t-1. We rerun the specifications in 
Table 4, columns (1) and (3) to (6) without these variables. The results are reported in 
Table 5.11 Our findings prove robust to these alternative specifications. All our results 
on the effect of the shock, the cushioning effects of aid and exchange rate flexibility, 
and the difference in the effects of aid in countries with pegs and countries with flexible 
exchange rates, go through. 
The model without the vector of long-run variables runs into a possible endogeneity 
problem. As the model is no longer a reparameterization of the autoregressive 
distributed lag model in levels, but a differenced model, the error terms are also first 
differenced. As a result, the error terms are first-order serially correlated by construction 
and the first lagged dependent variable is correlated with the contemporaneous error 
term, causing a biased coefficient. A second source of possible bias is the inclusion of 
fixed effects in our model, as the within group estimator is inconsistent for panels with 
relatively small T. This bias is likely to be small, given that for most countries T is 
relatively large. In the absence of other instruments for the lagged dependent variable in 
Table 5, we use an alternative instrumental variables technique first suggested by 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981). This technique proposes to first transform the model by 
first-differencing to eliminate possible individual effects and then instrument the lagged 
dependent variable with suitable lags of its own levels and first differences. Although 
consistent, the estimator is not efficient for panels with more than three periods, as for 
the later periods in the sample additional instruments are available. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) applied the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach to use all 
available instruments. Arellano and Bover (1995) extended this difference-GMM 
estimator by adding the equations in levels to the system, creating what is often called 
the system-GMM estimator. This addition increases the number of moment conditions, 
thereby increasing the efficiency of the estimator. Blundell and Bond (1998) showed 
that exploiting these additional moment conditions provides dramatic efficiency gains. 
We use the system-GMM estimator to deal with the endogeneity of the lagged 
dependent variable.12 In the differenced equation, which corresponds to the differenced 
version of the specification in Table 5, we instrument the lagged dependent variable 
with the third lag of its own level. This ensures that even if there is first- and second-
order serial correlation in the error term of the differenced model, the instrument for the 
dependent variable is not correlated with the contemporaneous error term. In the levels 
equation, which corresponds to the specification in Table 5, we instrument the lagged 
dependent variable with the second lag of its own difference. This ensures that in the 
presence of first-order serial correlation in the errors, the instrument for the lagged 
dependent variable is not correlated with the contemporaneous error term. 
                                                 
11   Below we apply system GMM to deal with the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable. We 
report the coefficient and standard error of the lagged dependent variable in Table 5 for comparison 
with Table 6. 
12  We use the xtabond2 procedure in Stata (Roodman 2005).   16
Table 5: The effect of negative commodity export price shocks – ARDL in differences with instrumented aid 
  full sample  full sample  full sample  pegs  floats 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δ (GDP per capita (log))t-1  0.173*** 0.077*** 0.073**  -0.042  0.074** 
  (0.032) (0.026) (0.029) (0.061) (0.035) 
Negative export price shockt-1  -0.018*** -0.036*** -0.062*** -0.100*** -0.035*** 
  (0.007) (0.012) (0.015) (0.035) (0.011) 
Aidt-1 * Negative export price shockt-1    0.014** 0.015** 0.047** 0.017*** 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.021) (0.007) 
Flexible exchange ratet-1 * Negative export price shockt-1    0.031***    
    (0.012)    
Number  of  observations  3805 1620 1257 419  838 
Number  of  countries  147  97 79 49 64 
R-squared within  0.14  0.14 0.17 0.23 0.22 
Notes: Table 5 only reports coefficients and standard errors of the variables of interest. The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita in year t. 
All regressions include country-specific and time-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The five columns correspond to the specifications in columns (1) and (3) to (6) of Table 4 but excluding 
the long-run level variables as regressors.   17
Table 6: The effect of negative commodity export price shocks – System GMM and IV with instrumented aid 
  full sample  full sample  full sample  pegs  floats 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δ (GDP per capita (log))t-1 0.194***  0.304**  0.266*  0.311**  0.379*** 
  (0.075) (0.136) (0.136) (0.160) (0.139) 
Negative export price shockt-1  -0.017*** -0.081*** -0.079*** -0.073*  -0.030** 
  (0.006) (0.029) (0.025) (0.040) (0.012) 
Aidt-1 * Negative export price shockt-1   0.039**  0.020*  0.026  0.016** 
    (0.016) (0.012) (0.024) (0.007) 
Flexible exchange ratet-1 * Negative export price shockt-1    0.038**    
    (0.019)    
Number  of  observations  3912 1634 1265 419  846 
Number  of  countries  147  97 79 49 64 
Number  of  instruments  136  90 94 39 39 
P-value Sargan test   0.56  0.40  0.88  -  - 
P-value  Difference  Sargan  test  0.37 0.30 1.00 -  - 
Arellano and Bond AR(1) test   -4.96***  -3.67***  -3.26***  -  - 
Arellano and Bond AR(2) test  -1.34  0.79  0.70  -  - 
Notes: The five columns correspond to the five columns in Table 5. In columns (1) to (3), instead of 2SLS fixed effects we apply the Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and 
Bond (1998) two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction and drop the second, third, and fourth lagged dependent variable. We use the third 
lagged dependent variable (only) as an instrument for the lagged dependent variable in the differenced equation, and the second lagged differenced dependent variable 
(only) for the first lagged dependent variable in the levels equation. To limit the instrument count, we ‘collapse’ the instrument set. For the specifications in columns (4) and 
(5), the number of GMM instruments was very large compared to the number of countries. In fact, the Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions generated 
implausibly good p values of 1.00 (see Roodman 2006). Therefore, we replaced the GMM estimator in columns (4) and (5) by a 2SLS fixed effects estimator in which we not 
only instrument for aid but also for the first lagged dependent variable. As an additional instrument, we use the second lag of the level of log GDP per capita.   18
The number of instruments in a system GMM can potentially grow very large, which 
causes problems of overfitting in finite samples and weakens the Sargan test of 
instrument validity up to the point where it generates implausibly good p values of 1.00. 
To minimize this problem, we take two steps to limit the instrument count (Roodman 
2006). First, we only use instruments at t-3 and t-2 in the differenced and levels 
equations, respectively, and thus leave out all instruments beyond t-2 and t-3. Second, 
we ‘collapse’ the instrument set, which means creating one instrument for each variable 
and lag distance, rather than one for each period, variable, and lag distance. 
The system-GMM estimation results are reported in Table 6, columns (1) to (3). For the 
specifications in columns (4) and (5), the number of GMM instruments was very large 
compared to the number of countries. Therefore, we replaced the GMM estimator in 
these columns by a 2SLS fixed effects estimator in which we not only instrument for aid 
but also for the first lagged dependent variable. As an additional instrument, we use the 
second lag of the level of log GDP per capita. The results in Table 6 lend further support 
to the idea that negative export price shocks harm growth in the next year and that both 
aid and exchange rate flexibility mitigate this growth effect. In particular, the shock 
enters negative and is significant at 1 per cent in the preferred specifications of columns 
(1) to (3). The interaction of aid with the shock again enters positive and is significant at 
5 per cent in column (2) and at 10 per cent in column (3). The coefficient on the 
interaction of exchange rate flexibility with the shock is also positive and is significant 
at 5 per cent. The Sargan tests and Difference Sargan tests do not reject the null of 
exogenous instruments, while the Arellano and Bond AR(1) and AR(2) tests show 
negative first-order serial correlation and no second-order serial correlation in the error 
terms. The latter suggests that the error terms in the original model of Table 5 are not 
serially correlated, which together with the relatively large T in our panel casts doubts 
on whether the lagged dependent variable is in effect suffering from endogeneity. The 
results in column (1) of Table 6 are consistent with these doubts as the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable is very similar to the corresponding coefficient in Table 5, 
column (1). However, for the other four columns the coefficients are quite different and 
suggest that the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable in Table 5 were 
downward biased.  
Finally, the specifications in Table 6, columns (4) and (5), should be viewed with 
caution as they do not use GMM but an instrumental variables technique which is 
known to be less efficient. In column (4), the shock enters with a negative sign and 
remains significant, although only at 10 per cent, while the interaction of the shock with 
aid is positive but no longer significant. While the coefficients of the shock and the 
interaction of the shock with aid are again smaller in countries with flexible exchange 
rates (column (5)), both coefficients are now significant at 5 per cent.  
We next perform two more robustness checks. First, we experiment with an alternative 
shock definition by defining positive and negative shocks as the observations with 
equation (2) residuals above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile, respectively, 
instead of the 90th or 10th percentile. All our results are highly robust to this more 
restrictive shock definition. In particular, our results on the effect of the shock, the 
cushioning effects of aid and exchange rate flexibility, and the difference in the effects of 
aid in countries with fixed exchange rates and countries with flexible exchange rates, go 
through. Second, we check the robustness of our results when dropping all interaction 
terms except for the ones with the lagged negative export price shock. Again, all our 
results go through. To save on space, we do not report these results.   19
Table 7: Which commodities drive the effect of negative commodity export price shocks? 
(a) estimation results 
(1) Negative oil price shockt-1 -0.101*** 
  (0.023) 
(2) Negative non-oil, non-agricultural price shockt-1 -0.050 
  (0.041) 
(3) Negative agricultural price shockt-1 0.020 
  (0.029) 
(4) Aidt-1 * Negative oil price shockt-1 0.033** 
  (0.015) 
(5) Aidt-1 * Negative non-oil, non-agricultural price shockt-1 0.030* 
  (0.017) 
(6) Aidt-1 * Negative agricultural price shockt-1 -0.009 
  (0.011) 
(7) Flexible exchange ratet-1 * Negative oil price shockt-1 0.059*** 
  (0.016) 
(8) Flexible exchange ratet-1 * Negative non-oil, non-agricultural price shockt-1 0.009 
  (0.035) 
(9) Flexible exchange ratet-1 * Negative agricultural price shockt-1 0.003 
  (0.019) 
Number of observations  1170 
Number of countries  70 
R-squared within  0.25 
(b) Wald tests of coefficient equality 
hypothesis p-value    hypothesis  p-value   hypothesis  p-value 
(1) = (2)  0.29    (4) = (5)  0.87    (7) = (8)  0.19 
(2) = (3)  0.18    (5) = (6)  0.07*    (8) = (9)  0.89 
(1) = (3)  0.00***    (4) = (6)  0.02**    (7) = (9)  0.02** 
Notes: Panel (a) reports estimation results of the specification in Table 4, column (4), but with shock variables that are 
decomposed into oil price shocks, non-oil, non-agricultural commodity price shocks, and agricultural commodity price 
shocks. We only report coefficients and standard errors of the variables of interest. Robust standard errors are clustered 
by country and are reported in parentheses. Panel (b) reports Wald tests of coefficient equality for the estimated 
coefficients in panel (a). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
We next construct three sub-indices to investigate which commodities drive our 
results13: one for oil only, one for agricultural commodities only, and one for non-oil, 
non-agricultural commodities only. For each of the three types, we construct a positive 
shock variable, which equals the first log difference of the index for the shock episodes 
identified using the methodology of section 2.1, and zero for all other observations, and 
a negative shock variable, which equals minus the first log difference of the index for 
the shock episodes and zero for all other observations. To test the importance of each 
commodity type in explaining our findings, we rerun the specification in Table 4, 
column (4), but with the decomposed shock variables instead of the general shock 
variables. The results are reported in Table 7 and indicate that our results are primarily 
                                                 
13  We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.   20
driven by non-agricultural commodity export price shocks. The coefficients of the oil 
price shock and its interactions with aid and exchange rate flexibility ((1), (4), and (7)) 
are fully consistent with the results in Table 4, column (4), and have the same levels of 
statistical significance. The coefficients for the other non-agricultural commodities ((2), 
(5), and (8)), although less significant, have the same signs as the coefficients for oil. 
Wald tests of coefficient equality, reported in Table 7, panel (b), do not reject the null of 
equal coefficients for oil and non-oil non-agriculture (tests (1)=(2), (4)=(5), and 
(7)=(8)). This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the 
effects of oil and other non-agricultural commodities. By contrast, the results for 
agriculture are not consistent with Table 4, column (4). In particular, the coefficients of 
the agricultural price shock and its interaction with aid have the opposite sign, while all 
three agricultural price shock variables are insignificant. The Wald tests indicate that the 
coefficients of the agricultural shock are always significantly different from the 
coefficients of the oil shocks (tests (1)=(3), (4)=(6), and (7)=(9)). This clearly suggests 
that the results in Table 4, column (4), are not driven by agricultural price shocks but 
instead can be explained by non-agricultural price shocks. This does not imply that aid 
does not mitigate adverse agricultural shocks. It merely means that the results of our 
analysis should be interpreted as strong evidence that aid mitigates the adverse effects 
of non-agricultural commodity export price shocks.14  
5  Does aid go to shock-prone countries? 
Our results suggest that the level of aid can be used to mitigate commodity export price 
shocks. A natural question is whether historically aid has been targeted at shock-prone 
countries. If not, donors might want to consider a re-allocation of their aid to make it 
more effective. We next investigate whether past aid has been targeted at shock-prone 
countries. In particular, we regress the country average level of aid over the sample 
years on 3 indicators of vulnerability to shocks and several controls. All variables, 
except for the 1960 (initial) level of GDP per capita, are expressed as country averages 
over the sample years. Hence, our units of observation are countries and we estimate by 
OLS. The results are reported in Table 8. Our three measures of proneness to shocks are 
the average number of shocks per year, using both our shock definitions, and the 
standard deviation of changes in the commodity export price index. The results in 
Table 8 show a lack of any robust evidence that aid is targeted towards shock-prone 
countries. The coefficients of the indicators of shock proneness are almost always 
insignificant. This finding is robust to the inclusion of colonial dummies, and the use of 
initial GDP per capita instead of average GDP per capita (as the latter might be 
endogenous) as a control variable. As a result, a re-allocation of aid towards shock-
prone countries might be beneficial as a means to improve aid effectiveness and assist 
commodity-dependent countries in coping with export price shocks. 
 
                                                 
14   As a final sensitivity test, we re-ran all specifications in Tables 3 and 4 for a subsample of Sub-
Saharan Africa. All results were highly similar. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.   21
Table 8: Does aid go to shock-prone countries? 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Number of shocks per year (10)  0.19      0.19      -0.53      -0.25     
  (0.88)    (0.88)    (1.05)    (1.00)    
Number of shocks per year (5)    2.63*      2.59*      0.06      0.37   
    (1.43)        (1.66)     (1.47)   
Standard deviation of change in 
commodity export price index 
(log) 
   0.41 
(0.85) 
   0.49 
(0.85) 
   -0.55 
(0.97) 
   -0.31 
(0.89) 
GDP per capita, PPP (log)  -0.82***  -0.82***  -0.81***  -0.80***  -0.80***  -0.78***        
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)             
1960 GDP per capita, PPP (log)              -0.62*** -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62*** 
         (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Population  (log)  -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.32*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.27*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
German  colony  -0.05 -0.04 -0.06        -0.21 -0.19 -0.19       
  (0.09) (0.11) (0.09)        (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)       
US  colony  0.11  0.04  0.11      -0.02  -0.02  -0.02     
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)        (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)       
French  colony  -0.03  -0.07  -0.10      0.21  0.21  0.22     
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)        (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)       
UK  colony  -0.13 -0.12 -0.19      -0.08  -0.06  -0.07     
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)        (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)       
Japanese  colony  0.58***  0.62***  0.58***      0.10  0.12  0.09     
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)        (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)       
Number  of  observations  147  147  78  147  147  124  78 78 78 78 78 78 
R-squared  0.71 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.70 
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Notes to Table 8: All columns report cross-sectional OLS results. The dependent variable is the country 
average level of aid for all available years in our sample. The number of shocks per year (10) and the 
number of shocks per year (5) denote the country average numbers of (10% and 5% threshold) shocks per 
year for the years in our sample. The standard deviation of the change in the export price index is 
calculated per country for all the available years. GDP per capita, PPP, and population, are expressed as 
country averages for the years in our sample. The colonial dummies are time invariant. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
6 Conclusions 
We have found that large adverse commodity export price shocks reduce constant price 
GDP. The costs arise from realized shocks rather than the ex ante risk of shocks. This is 
a problem that continues to be faced by a relatively small group of low-income 
countries that have failed to diversify their exports. The decline in constant price GDP 
compounds the decline in income that is an inevitable consequence of terms of trade 
deterioration, and so subjects already fragile societies to episodes of economic crisis. It 
is now known that even temporary periods of intensified poverty can have long-lasting 
effects. At the household level temporary poverty can lead to permanent deterioration in 
human capital. At the societal level, growth collapses increase the risk of civil war 
(Miguel et al. 2004). Hence, it is pertinent to determine whether aid can mitigate such 
episodes. We find that shock-contingent aid does not appear to be effective but that a 
sustained higher level of aid does significantly mitigate shocks. De facto exchange rate 
flexibility also mitigates shocks and is, to an extent, a substitute for aid. However, even 
with a flexible exchange rate, aid significantly reduces the cost of adverse shocks. 
Data appendix 
This appendix provides the data sources for the variables used in estimation.  
Real GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars (World Development Indicators – 
WDI). 
Trade openness trade as a per cent of GDP (WDI). 
External debt to gross national product (Global Development Finance).  
Inflation consumer price index (2000=100) (WDI). 
Financial development money and quasi money (M2) as per cent of GDP (WDI).  
Commodity export price index  1990  commodity export values from UNCTAD 
Commodity Yearbook 2000 and United Nations International Trade Statistics 
1993/1994; quarterly world commodity price indices from International Financial 
Statistics (IFS, series 76, except for butter and coal where we use series 74). Coal, 
plywood, silver, and sorghum price series had several short gaps in the early sample 
periods. Following Dehn (2000), we filled these gaps by holding the price constant at 
the value of the first available observation. Palmkerneloil, bananas, tobacco, and silver 
price series had 1, 2, or 3 missing quarterly values in the middle. These gaps were filled 
by linear interpolation. Price series with larger gaps were not adjusted. However, where   23
gaps would cause missing export price index observations in countries for which this 
commodity was relatively unimportant (share of commodity’s exports in total < 10 per 
cent), these price series were left out. The geometrically weighted commodity export 
price index was first calculated on a quarterly basis and deflated by the export unit value 
(IFS, series 74.DZF). We then calculated the annual averages and took the log, which 
gave us the unweighted commodity export price index. This index was used to construct 
the indicators of commodity export price shocks and uncertainty. In our estimation, we 
use the commodity export price index, weighted by the ratio of commodity exports to 
GDP (%). 
Commodity exports to GDP (%) 1990 commodity export values, see commodity export 
price index. GDP is in current US dollars for 1990 (World Development Indicators). 
Commodity export price shocks and export price uncertainty See Section 2.1. 
Oil import price index world oil price index from IFS (series 00176AADZF); dummy 
variable for net oil importing countries based on 2001 net oil imports; net oil imports 
are crude oil imports plus total imports of refined petroleum products minus crude oil 
exports minus total exports of refined petroleum products, all from Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) International Energy Annual 2002. Since these components are 
expressed in thousands of barrels per day, we multiplied them by 365 times the 2001 
average weekly world oil price per barrel, also from EIA. If oil imports > 0, dummy=1, 
0 otherwise.  
Geological, climatic, and human disasters geological disasters: earthquakes, landslides, 
volcano eruptions, tidal waves; climatic disasters: floods, droughts, extreme 
temperatures, wind storms; human disasters: famines, epidemics. Each variable is 
constructed as the annual number of episodes that qualify as large disasters according to 
the criteria of the IMF (2003): ≥ 0.5% of population affected, or damage ≥ 0.5% of 
GDP, or ≥ 1 death per 10000 people. Data from WHO Collaborating Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. 
Civil war dummy variable: 1 for civil war, 0 otherwise (Gleditsch 2004).  
Coup d’etat number of extra constitutional or forced changes in the top government 
elite and/or its effective control of the nation’s power structure in a given year (Banks’ 
Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive). Unsuccessful coups are not counted. 
Exchange rate flexibility dummy variable based on the course classification of exchange 
rate regimes in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004); dummy=0 for episodes with no separate 
legal tender, a pre-announced peg, a currency board, a pre-announced horizontal band 
that is narrower than or equal to +/– 2%, or a de facto peg, 1 for all other episodes. 
Foreign aid as a % of GNI Official development assistance from all donors as a per cent 
of GNI (OECD International Development Statistics, variable 286). 
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